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Currency usage began a long trend decline in the decades
after World War II. This was expected to continue, and even
accelerate, owing to payment technology innovations. Surpris-
ingly, however, such usage as a percentage of GDP stopped
falling and has increased quite sharply in recent years in most
countries, with Sweden the major outlier. We examine to what
extent this may have been due to increasing interest elasticity,
nearing the zero lower bound, and also to rising tax evasion,
as indirect taxes rise. We also show how currency holdings
increased temporarily as the financial crisis struck in 2008.
JEL Codes: E40, E49, E63, H26, N10, N20.
1. Introduction
Currency usage, as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP),
peaked in most developed countries toward the end of World War
II, and then began a long trend decline. Data for the United
States, the United Kingdom, the euro zone, and Japan are shown
in figure 1. This decline has been ascribed mainly to innovations
and improvements in payments technologies, e.g., a widening use
of bank accounts and checks, followed by the availability of plas-
tic (debit and credit) cards, and now electronic transactions (Inter-
net/mobile phones). Insofar as anyone thought much about currency
usage, it was generally viewed as an outdated relic, whose survival
was in some large part a kindliness to the aged, unfamiliar with a
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Figure 1. Currency-to-GDP Ratios (%)
Sources: Ashworth and Goodhart, Friedman and Schwartz (1963), U.S. Bureau
of Economic Analysis, U.S. Federal Reserve Board, Bank of England: Three cen-
turies of macroeconomic data—version 2.2, July 2015 (U.K. GDP data annual
prior to 1955), U.K. Office for National Statistics, European Central Bank, OEF,
Bank of Japan, Cabinet Office of Japan.
Note: For Japan we use gross domestic expenditure until the end of 1979 and
gross domestic product subsequently.
world of swipe cards and PayPal; see Friedman (1999), King (1999),
and more recently Wolman (2012). As the current generation of
aged departed, so we would move toward a payment system where
currency—notes and coins, but primarily notes1—would have disap-
peared. The opening page of Amromin and Chakravorti (2009) has
the following quotes; also see Krueger (2016).2
“Except for the smallest of transactions, money will no longer
be a physical thing.” (Forbes 1967 as cited in Flannery 1996)
“The use of cash and currency will drop drastically.” (Flannery
and Jaffee 1973)
“Cash is dirty, inefficient — and obsolete.” (Gleick 1996)
1Bank notes typically account for around 95–97 percent of total notes and
coins in circulation in developed countries.
2But for a more considered, and contrary, point of view largely based on empir-
ical studies, see Bagnall et al. (2014), Beer, Gnan, and Birchler (2016), Boeschoten
(1992), Drehmann, Goodhart, and Krueger (2002), and Fischer, Kohler, and Seitz
(2004).
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“The end of the cash era.” (The Economist 2007, cover page)
Insofar as we did think along these lines—i.e., that cash hold-
ings would continue to decline, relative to GDP—we were wrong. In
section 2 of this paper we show that, in many developed economies,
currency usage (as a percentage of GDP) stopped falling in the
mid-1980s/early 1990s, and in a number of countries then began
to rise.
Almost all of the alternative transaction technologies are bank
mediated, i.e., check payments, debit/credit cards, etc. Banks can,
and do, fail, whereas the liability of the government remains valid
(often legal tender), e.g., for tax payment, as long as that form of
government survives.3 So, when a generalized concern for the credit-
worthiness of banks as a group develops, a shift from bank deposits
into cash ensues, as in the United States in the Great Depression,
1929–33.
In a telling, but temporary, example of this, there was a spike
in currency holdings in most, but not all, of the countries included
in our analysis in 2008:Q4. This emergent panic was, however, soon
halted by the aggressive, and often unconventional, monetary poli-
cies of central banks; see Bernanke (2015) and Geithner (2014). As
we show in section 3, calm in this sense was soon restored, and the
shift out of bank deposits into currency, i.e., a rise in the currency-
to-deposit (C/D) ratio, was neither as long-lasting nor nearly as
extreme as in the United States during the Great Depression in
1929–33. In a companion short paper, we shall compare develop-
ments in C/D ratios in 2008–09 with those that occurred in 1929–33,
focusing primarily on the United States and the United Kingdom.
Although the effect of the 2008–09 bank crisis had mostly dis-
appeared from our time series by 2009:Q4, this did not check
the continuing upward trend in currency usage. Indeed, in sev-
eral countries—e.g., the United States, Australia, South Korea, and
Switzerland—this upward trend has become stronger.4 This has
3Some governments also fail, owing to lost wars or revolutions, and then their
paper notes become worthless, e.g., the Confederacy in the United States.
4An outlying example of a developed country where currency usage has contin-
ued to decline, even quite markedly, in recent years is Sweden. This is despite the
fact that the central bank has introduced negative interest rates there. Sweden
242 International Journal of Central Banking June 2020
practical policy relevance. The zero lower bound (ZLB) to (risk-
less) interest rates is caused by the ability of agents holding finan-
cial assets to switch them into zero-yielding currency notes. The
recent sharp rise in currency usage, especially in high-denomination
notes, is likely to be a symptom of this. We examine the developing
relationship between interest rates and currency usage in section 4.
Our particular focus is to examine whether the interest elasticity of
demand for cash has increased as interest rates have fallen to the
zero lower bound and beyond, into negative territory, i.e., whether
such elasticity is potentially nonlinear.
Besides its zero-yield feature, another key characteristic of cur-
rency is that it is an anonymous, bearer, instrument. This makes it
the payment mechanism of choice for those who do not want their
transactions to be recorded, more widely known, and capable of
being used in evidence against them. Since the black economy (ille-
gal transactions) and the grey economy (transactions which would
be legal if recorded and taxed, but are transacted anonymously by
cash to evade taxation, plus some low-reputation activities) are not
recorded by design, it is difficult to estimate how much of outstand-
ing currency is held to facilitate such nefarious dealings. However, we
do our best to explore this in section 5. The most vocal critic of this
usage of currency, especially in the form of high-denomination notes,
has been Rogoff (1998, 2015, 2016), but also see Sands (2016). Cryp-
tocurrencies such as Bitcoin are also becoming a medium of choice
for the black economy (see Wolf 2019) and could increasingly be
favored over cash in activities such as blackmail, kidnapping, sanc-
tion busting, drug smuggling, etc., given that it avoids the need for
physical pickup. Even though the speculative boom in Bitcoin is
now past, its value has not gone down to zero, but has been quite
stable over the last few months at around $3,800. One suspects this
is because there is a regular clientele continuing to use it for black
economy purposes.
Since the characteristics of currency cause this instrument to
become the lower barrier to nominal interest rates, at a time of slug-
gish growth and low inflation (i.e., ZLB), and to be the transaction
provides an interesting case study, which again we shall review in a companion
paper.
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medium of choice both for criminality and tax evasion, it is not sur-
prising that a cottage industry has grown up in this literature about
how to abolish currency, or to change its characteristics in such a
way as to mitigate these side effects. Much of this work was brought
together in a 2015 conference titled “Removing the Zero Lower
Bound on Interest Rates” at the Imperial College Business School
where speakers included Kenneth Rogoff, Willem Buiter, Marvin
Goodfriend, David Humphrey, and Miles Kimball. Also see Agar-
wall and Kimball (2015) and Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2003). Our
response to this was published in the Sveriges Riksbank’s Economic
Review ; see Goodhart, Bartsch, and Ashworth (2016).
Our contribution here to this literature is fourfold. First, we
extend the description, and analysis, of aggregate currency usage in
a cross-country study by several years. Second, we are, we believe,
one of the first to document the spike in currency demand in several
countries caused by the financial panic in the final quarter of 2008
(post-Lehman).5 Third, now that the zero lower bound has been
reached, and in some countries transcended into negative interest
rates, we revert to the question of the interest elasticity of demand
for currency. Fourth, we explore further the relationship between the
demand for currency and tax evasion.
2. The Recovery of Currency Usage
After falling steadily in the decades after World War II, currency
usage began to stabilize as a share of GDP in a number of major
countries—e.g., the United States and the United Kingdom in the
mid-1980s/early 1990s—and then began to rise gradually during the
1990s (see figure 1 and table 1).
This stabilization and gradual rise came despite ongoing rapid
developments in payment technologies, which should have reduced
the use of notes and coins further. For example, the number of con-
sumer transactions carried out by debit/credit cards soared during
this period (see table 2). The number of card transactions has con-
tinued to rise sharply in the post-financial-crisis period, with data
showing that card payments per capita increased from 62.5 and
5Cusbert and Rohling (2013) did this exercise for Australia, and Bartzsch and
Seitz (2015) did so for Germany.
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Table 2. Per Capita Use of New Payment Instruments
Debit Cards Credit Cards
1987 1999 1987 1999
United States 0.42 27.5 29.55 68.94
United Kingdom 0.00 35.3 9.19 25.10
France 9.69 48.6 0.05 N/A
Germany 0.01 5.2 0.62 4.00
Italy 0.00 4.3 0.22 3.80
Japan 0.01 N/A 2.88 6.51
Canada 0.01 54.3 27.16 37.50
Sweden 3.21 22.2 1.79 6.40
Source: Drehmann, Goodhart, and Krueger (2002).
140.3 in the euro zone and the United Kingdom in 2010, to 80.1
and 201.4, respectively, in 2014; see European Central Bank (2015).
In the United States, card payments (credit plus debit) per capita
increased from 191 in 2009 to 233 on the latest available data for
2012; see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2013).
In most developed countries, currency usage declined or rose
modestly in the pre-crisis decade, although the euro zone was the
major outlier, perhaps due to the fact that the euro’s introduc-
tion much increased its international attraction as a store of value.6
Currency usage in Japan also continued to rise quite briskly, a con-
tinuation of the trend (albeit at a slower pace) since the slowdown
in the economy after the bursting of its real estate bubble in the
early 1990s. Key drivers likely were the lower interest rate (which
has been close to zero since late 1995), falling prices, and concerns
about the stability of banks. There was a particularly sharp jump in
its currency-to-GDP ratio in the early part of that decade amid the
ongoing banking crisis, although the currency-to-GDP ratio broadly
flatlined in the immediate years before the Great Financial Crisis
(GFC).
6There were particularly large gains in currency in circulation in Finland,
France, and Germany, although it is not clear why this was the case, as a euro
printed in one country is treated identically to one printed in another.
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Subsequently, currency usage has been more generally rising,
indeed quite sharply and consistently in most countries since the
onset of the GFC. Our broader data set consists of 36 countries
(OECD plus the BRIC countries), representing over three-quarters
of global GDP when measured at purchasing power parity, and runs
to 2016:Q1. We plan to revisit this analysis in a couple of years’ time
when we have an additional five years of data to utilize. Strikingly, 40
percent of countries still had declining currency-to-GDP ratios in the
pre-crisis period between 1999:Q4 and 2007:Q4. The largest fall was
recorded by Norway at −37 percent, followed by Spain, China, and
Sweden at −36 percent, −26 percent, and −21 percent, respectively.
Nevertheless, the median increase in the currency-to-GDP ratio of all
countries during this period was 8.9 percent, with lower and upper
quartiles of −5.9 percent and 31.1 percent, respectively. In the post-
crisis period between 2007:Q4 and 2016:Q1, just five countries (14
percent of our sample) had a declining currency-to-GDP ratio. These
were Sweden, Norway, China, South Africa, and Brazil, with all but
the last previously having declining currency-to-GDP ratios in the
pre-crisis period. Sweden registered the largest fall at −54 percent,
followed by Norway and China at −12 percent and −11 percent,
respectively. The other major Scandinavian country, Denmark, was
also initially on course to have a declining currency-to-GDP ratio
in the post-crisis period, until currency holdings began to accelerate
since the introduction of negative rates in late 2014. The median
increase in the post-crisis period was 38 percent, with the lower and
upper quartiles at 19.2 percent and 60.9 percent, respectively. The
OECD countries recorded a median increase of 50 percent, with the
lower and upper quartiles at 25.1 percent and 64.9 percent, respec-
tively. The largest increases in the post-crisis period were Greece,
South Korea, Iceland, and Switzerland at 164 percent, 110 percent,
121 percent, and 93 percent, respectively.
As a result of the sharp rise since the financial crisis, the aver-
age amount of currency holdings per working-age individual has
risen to $8,806 (Japan), $5,500 (United States), $4,106 (euro zone),
and $1,907 (United Kingdom) at current market exchange rates.
This represents real terms increases of 66 percent, 57 percent, 112
percent, and 56 percent since the beginning of the century. Note,
large overseas holdings of the U.S. dollar (see Judson 2012) and
the euro exaggerate the amount of currency held domestically per
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Figure 2. High-Denomination Notes Have Been the Key
Drivers of the Increase in Currency Holdings
Sources: Ashworth and Goodhart, U.S. Department of Treasury’s Bureau of
the Fiscal Service, U.S. Federal Reserve Board, European Central Bank, Bank of
Japan, Bank of England.
Note: United States = $100; euro zone = €500, €200, €100, €50 notes; Japan =
10,000; United Kingdom = £50.
working-age individual in these regions. Nevertheless, even adjusting
for that, the amounts per head still appear extremely large.
The rise in currency usage, and particularly sharp gains since
the GFC, has been driven by a sharp increase in high-denomination
notes (see figure 2). Of the 78 percent, 58 percent, 17 percent,
and 55 percent increase in currency in circulation in the United
States, the euro zone, Japan, and the United Kingdom since the
beginning of the GFC, 85 percent (73 percent of stock in 2007:Q4)
($100 bill), 95 percent (89 percent of stock in 2007:Q4) (€50, €100,
€200, and €500 notes), 98.5 percent (86 percent of stock in 2007:Q4)
(10,000 note), and 23.7 percent (16.9 percent of stock in 2007:Q4)
(£50 note) of the increase has come from the highest-denomination
notes. However, the value of the very highest euro denomination
note (€500) in circulation has declined by almost 8 percent since
December 2015. This appears to be related to the increased spate
of media stories linking it to use in crime and financing terrorism;
see Brunsden and Spiegel (2016), Europol (2015), Kay (2015), and
Sands (2016). In May 2016, the European Central Bank announced
that it would end issuance and production of the note by the end of
2018.
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3. Measuring Public Panic in the Great Financial Crisis
Monetary authorities around the world did learn from the bitter
experience of the United States in 1931–33 that it should be their
responsibility and duty to halt banking panics and to prevent the
collapse of the banking system. As then Federal Reserve Governor
Ben Bernanke remarked at a conference speech in honor of Milton
Friedman (Bernanke 2002): “Let me end my talk by abusing slightly
my status as an official representative of the Federal Reserve. I would
like to say to Milton and Anna: Regarding the Great Depression.
You’re right, we did it. We’re very sorry. But thanks to you, we
won’t do it again.” Indeed, central banks supported the financial
system in several ways during the Great Financial Crisis. In partic-
ular, they injected massive extra liquidity into the banking system
and reduced interest rates toward the zero lower bound, followed
by more quantitative easing (see Ashworth 2013, Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements 2016, and International Monetary Fund 2013);
they widened and eased access to their lender-of-last-resort facilities
and, where short-term markets became dysfunctional, they became
market makers of last resort; and, in conjunction with the fiscal
authorities, they prevented, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers,
any further failures of large, systemically important banks.
This strong response, which is by now well documented, meant
that the initial panic was relatively short-lived. In order to capture
its onset, duration, and intensity, one ideally needs monthly data.
Our metric here is changes in the C/D ratio. We use data for the
levels and the monthly and three-month-on-three-month changes in
these ratios for a selection of developed countries (see figures 3–8).
The main countries/regions we focus on are the United States, the
United Kingdom, and the euro zone; data for Canada, Australia,
New Zealand, Sweden, and Japan are available separately from the
authors.
For the United Kingdom, the monthly percentage change in the
C/D ratio in October 2008 (seasonally adjusted) is relatively large,
at 1.5 percent, but, as can be seen from figure 6, this is not that
much greater than some other large monthly changes in what is a
quite volatile series. There were, however, a number of other months
around that date when there were other sizable increases in the C/D
ratio, so the three-month-on-three-month percentage change does
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Figure 3. U.K. Currency-to-Deposit Ratio
Sources: Ashworth and Goodhart, Bank of England.
Figure 4. U.S. Currency-to-Deposit Ratio
Sources: Ashworth and Goodhart, U.S. Federal Reserve Board.
rise to a clear peak of 2.7 percent in December 2008. In the United
Kingdom there had been an earlier concern with the safety of bank
deposits on the occasion of the run on Northern Rock bank in Sep-
tember 2007; as highlighted in figures 3 and 6, however, the response
of the C/D ratio to the financial disturbances in September/October
2008 is far greater than in September/October 2007. Indeed, there
was little change in the C/D ratio in response to the Northern
Rock incident, perhaps because it was seen as a small, regional
bank, having only around 2 percent of aggregate retail deposits,
whose problems were largely idiosyncratic, and with few systemic
implications.
There is an exactly similar break in the downward trend in the
C/D ratio in the United States (figure 4), although the reversal is
250 International Journal of Central Banking June 2020
Figure 5. Euro-Zone Currency-to-Deposit Ratio
Sources: Ashworth and Goodhart, European Central Bank.
Figure 6. Changes in U.K. Currency-to-Deposit Ratio
Sources: Ashworth and Goodhart, Bank of England.
not as sharp as in the United Kingdom. There is some indication
of an earlier increase in the C/D ratio in the aftermath of the res-
cue of Bear Stearns in March 2008, but this appears to have been
decisively reduced in September, perhaps in relief after the rescue
of the two government-sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Fred-
die Mac. Then there is a whole series of months, until about March
2009, with large percentage changes in the C/D ratio, so that the
three-month-on-three-month change rises to a local peak of 2.1 per-
cent in February 2009 (figure 7). We extended the chart showing the
percentage monthly and three-month-on-three-month changes in the
United States back to 1997, to illustrate the jumps in December 1999
Vol. 16 No. 3 The Surprising Recovery of Currency Usage 251
Figure 7. Changes in U.S. Currency-to-Deposit Ratio
Sources: Ashworth and Goodhart, U.S. Federal Reserve Board.
Figure 8. Changes in Euro-Zone Currency-to-Deposit
Ratio
Sources: Ashworth and Goodhart, European Central Bank.
and January 2000, amid the Y2K scare, and its immediate reversal
in February 2000. There is also a sharp increase in October 2001,
perhaps in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks.
Unlike the United Kingdom and the United States, the C/D ratio
in the euro zone had been trending upward, prior to the GFC, most
likely due to the euro’s greater use as a store of value internationally
beyond the boundaries of the European Union (EU). This upward
trend had slackened, however, by late 2006/07 (figure 5). Then in
October 2008, there was a marked, sharp increase in the C/D ratio,
252 International Journal of Central Banking June 2020
Figure 9. Contribution of High-Denomination Notes to
Change in Money Stock Value in Various Countries,
2008:Q4–2009:Q1
Sources: Ashworth and Goodhart, U.S. Department of Treasury’s Bureau of the
Fiscal Service, Bank of England, European Central Bank, Bank of Japan, Reserve
Bank of Australia.
of no less than 5.3 percent (figure 8). This was, however, a one-time
occurrence, with no subsequent reversal but no continuation.
Whereas the short-lived shift out of deposits into currency was
clearly apparent in the United Kingdom, the United States, and the
euro zone, it was less so in other developed countries.
Meanwhile, this shift into currency was primarily driven by
a sharp, but temporary, increase in the holdings of the highest-
denomination notes (see table 3 and figure 9), providing some sup-
port to the view that it was driven by an incipient panic rather
than an interest rate effect. In the United States and the United
Kingdom, the holdings of $100 and £50 notes increased by 3.5 per-
cent in both countries in October 2008, which represented 14- and
6-standard-deviation increases, respectively, relative to the average
of comparable months in previous years. In 2008:Q4 and 2009:Q1,
the holdings of $100 and £50 notes increased by approximately
four to five standard deviations of the typical rise in those quarters
over recent history. There was very little evidence of a consistent
pickup in note holdings at lower denominations in either coun-
try in response to the crisis, although in October 2008 there were
quite strong increases in the demand for $50 and £20 and £10
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notes.7 For the period of elevated financial market stress, 2008:Q4–
2009:Q1, $100 and £50 notes accounted for 94 percent and 31 per-
cent of the increase in the money stock, despite representing a
far lower proportion of overall money holdings. In the euro zone,
in addition to quite a significant pickup in €500 notes in circula-
tion, there was also a significant increase in both €200 and €100
notes in circulation over 2008:Q4 and 2009:Q1 (see table 3). Hold-
ings of €500, €200, and €100 notes represented 80 percent of the
increase in money stock between 2008:Q4 and 2009:Q1, despite
representing around 57 percent of the stock in money holdings.
There was not much evidence of a consistent pickup in demand for
lower-denomination notes over the six-month period, although there
was a sharp pickup in demand for €20 and €50 notes in October
2008.
4. Relationship between Interest Rates and Currency
Usage
Since the work of Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956), virtually all
studies of the demand for currency have incorporated a measure
of the scale of transactions, e.g., consumption or GDP, a short-
term interest rate, and, usually, some statistic to represent trend
innovation in transaction technology, e.g., usage of automated teller
machines (ATMs) and plastic (credit and debit) cards. The econo-
metric techniques have become more sophisticated, from simple
regression analysis (e.g., Becker 1975, Dotsey 1988), to cointegration
analysis (Drehman, Goodhart, and Krueger 2002; Fischer, Kohler,
and Seitz 2004), to vector error-correction models (Bartzsch and
Seitz 2015; Bartzsch, Seitz, and Setzer 2015). For an application of
VECM techniques to a less-developed economy, see Nachane et al.
(2013).
But the general findings have remained rather stable, with a
transaction demand for currency nearer unity, rather than the value
7In their analysis of consumer cash usage, Bagnall et al. (2014) did not observe
any unusual developments in the usage of low-denomination notes in the seven
countries in their study in 2008–09.
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of 0.5 suggested by Baumol and Tobin, and an interest elasticity that
is negative and usually significant, but rather lower than had been
expected. There is a common chorus remarking on its relatively low
level, e.g., Alvarez and Lippi (2007, p. 34); Bartzsch and Seitz (2015,
p. 37); Becker (1975, p. 69); and Briglevics and Schuh (2014, pp. 22–
23). An issue of more discussion and debate is whether the market
and demand for high-denomination notes, for hoarding at home or
abroad, differs significantly from that for low-denomination notes,
purely for transactions and, if so (and it is generally agreed that
they do differ), whether the interest elasticity is much greater in the
case of high-denomination notes. Drehmann, Goodhart, and Krueger
(2002, p. 197) are among those who agree that “there are two sep-
arate markets (needs) for currency, although the precise dividing
lines between them are fuzzy,” but, in their econometric work, do
not find differing interest elasticities; see table 5, p. 209. In con-
trast, Amromin and Chakravorti (2009, table 5, panel B, p. 329)
and Fischer, Kohler, and Seitz (2004, section 4.2.2) do find that,
whereas large bank note holdings have a significant negative inter-
est elasticity, small note holdings do not. The general consensus
now is that the interest elasticity of demand for high-denomination
notes is absolutely greater (negative) and more significant than for
low-denomination notes.
We do not aim to revisit this latter question of the distinction
between the interest rate elasticity on high- and low-denomination
note holdings here. Instead, our focus is whether the interest elas-
ticity might increase as interest rates decline toward the ZLB or, in
some instances, even below.
There is no strong reason to assume a linear relationship between
the level of interest rates available on bank deposits, and on other liq-
uid assets, and the demand for currency. Briglevics and Schuh (2014,
pp. 25–26 and figure 5) suggest that the interest elasticity of currency
demand might rise at low levels of interest rates. Indeed, commer-
cial banks, up until now, have been reluctant to impose negative
interest rates on retail bank deposits (particularly for households)
(see figure 10), partly for fear of a mass exodus out of deposits into
cash, but as the nominal return on deposits and other liquid assets
approaches (and perhaps moves below) zero, it is perfectly possible
that the absolute value of the interest elasticity of currency demand
might rise, perhaps very sharply so.
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Figure 10. Interest Rates on Household Deposits at
Commercial Banks, %*
Sources: Ashworth and Goodhart, European Central Bank, Swiss National
Bank.
*Deposits with agreed maturity less than two years outstanding. Interest rates
on savings deposits for Switzerland.
The relationships between changes in cash holdings and changes
in interest rates vary from country to country; charts on this
relationship for Australia, Denmark, the euro zone, Sweden, Switzer-
land, and the United Kingdom are separately available from the
authors. We exclude Japan from our analysis since the official target
rate has been near the ZLB throughout the period under review; the
United States is also excluded since over half of its currency is held
abroad (see, for example, Judson 2012). In Denmark, Switzerland,
and to a lesser extent the euro area, there appears to be a reason-
ably strong inverse relationship between changes in official interest
rates and current and subsequent changes in the percentage growth
of currency outstanding. Admittedly, at times there have been large
moves in currency in circulation not caused by changes in interest
rates, and it is likely to have been the panic caused by the financial
crisis that drove the sharp jump in currency demand in 2008 and
2009 rather than the collapse in interest rates per se. Similarly, the
intensification of the euro crisis over 2011 and 2012:H1 is likely to
have been a factor driving currency holdings higher in some coun-
tries. Nevertheless, as banking-related worries have subsided, as the
euro-zone economy has recovered over the past couple of years, cash
holdings have still risen quite sharply in all three regions as interest
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rates have moved into negative territory.8 In Sweden, no such rela-
tionship can be observed. While the initial move there into negative
interest rates appears to have caused a temporary hiatus in the
pace of decline of currency holdings, the sharp structural downtrend
appears to have subsequently resumed.
In order to attempt to quantify these bilateral relationships more
precisely, we used regression analysis. We initially considered regress-
ing the monthly change in currency in circulation against its lagged
value and lagged changes in official short-term central bank pol-
icy rates. But in an attempt to identify the sensitivity of currency
demand by the general public to changes in interest rates somewhat
more accurately, we used actual interest rates on household deposit
accounts at commercial banks. Indeed, using official interest rates,
many of which have gone negative, could underestimate the impact
(potentially nonlinear) on the currency demand of the general pub-
lic from negative interest rates. This is because in almost all cases
commercial banks have yet to move interest rates into negative terri-
tory on household deposit accounts.9 In our equation (see below) we
used the contemporaneous value of the interest rate on household
deposits rather than the lagged value. This is because changes in
interest rates on household deposits typically lag changes in official
interest rates by around one month, and there might be some level
of anticipation of forthcoming changes.
We attempted to test for nonlinearity (changes in the sensitiv-
ity of currency demand to changes in interest rates) in three main
ways. First, in our full-sample regressions we included a squared
measure of the distance between the contemporaneous interest rate
and the lowest level reached. A positive and significant coefficient
would indicate the presence of nonlinearity. Second, we also ran the
regressions over three subperiods: (i) pre-crisis10 (beginning of 2003
8In Australia and the United Kingdom, where interest rates are still positive,
currency in circulation has been growing quickly, particularly in the former. Aus-
tralian interest rates have been coming down quite sharply in recent years, from
almost 5 percent in 2011 to just 1.5 percent at present.
9In some countries commercial banks have imposed negative deposit rates on
nonfinancial corporations, and in Switzerland negative rates have been applied
on household accounts focused on individuals with higher net worth.
10Caution must be exhibited with our pre-crisis estimates for the euro zone and
Sweden due to limited sample sizes. For the euro zone, we began the sample in
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to 2008:M6); (ii) post-crisis (2009:M7 to 2016:M1); and (iii) since
official interest rates hit the zero lower bound in the respective
countries (this is yet to occur in Australia and the United King-
dom). We used the zero bound instead of the point that interest
rates went negative because in some countries official interest rates
have not been in negative territory long enough to generate a signif-
icant enough sample size. We wanted such a subsample because we
suspected a priori that the media attention around a move in rates
to zero/negative would likely focus the attention of the general pub-
lic on the low and declining rates (even though actual interest rates
on household deposits have yet to hit zero or turn negative) and
could potentially fuel nonlinear changes in currency demand. Third,
we also ran various rolling regressions in the post-crisis period. The
general form of the equation was
% d currt = a + b d currt−i + c d intt + γ(intt − int/low)2 + εt.
(1)
In table 4, we show the coefficient on the change in interest rates
and its p-value and for the full sample we also show the coeffi-
cient on the squared term, its p-value, and the adjusted R2. We
included a dummy variable, where appropriate, for the GFC and
extremely sparingly when there were other large seemingly inexplic-
able changes. Our regressions were run in levels rather than logs.
This is because we would not have been able to include the squared
term to test for nonlinearity, as the term is zero when interest rates
are at the minimum (natural log of zero is undefined). The coef-
ficients on interest rates in Australia, the euro zone, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom have the correct sign over the full sam-
ple, with Australia significant at the 1 percent level, Switzerland
and the United Kingdom significant at the 5 percent level, and
the euro zone insignificant. The coefficients on Denmark and Swe-
den have the incorrect signs and are not statistically significant.
The squared terms are statistically insignificant or have the wrong
signs.
2006:H2 because before that, currency usage had been trending strongly higher
due to the euro’s increased use as a storage of value after the introduction of
notes and coins in 2002. In Sweden, the data on deposit rates only started in
September 2005.
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Comparing the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, only Australia
and the United Kingdom have the correct sign in the pre-crisis
period, and both are statistically insignificant. In the post-crisis
period, the coefficient on interest rates in all countries has the correct
sign, except for the United Kingdom.11 But only the coefficients on
Australia and Switzerland are statistically significant. In the period
since official interest rates hit zero in Denmark, the euro zone, Swe-
den, and Switzerland (they have yet to do so in Australia and the
United Kingdom), the coefficients all have the correct signs, and
the absolute magnitude of the coefficients has increased in three of
the four countries (significantly so in the euro zone). The relation-
ship also appears to have turned statistically significant in the euro
zone.
Running various rolling regressions for the post-crisis period, we
found that the Swiss deposit rate on savings had the correct sign
from June 2013 onward but only became statistically significant in
February 2015, at which point the negative coefficient on deposit
rates increased by a multiple of almost 10. There was quite a large
increase in the adjusted R2 too at this point. The Swiss National
Bank had cut its official rate from 0 percent in November 2014 to
−0.25 percent in December and −0.75 percent in January 2015, but
savings rates had only experienced rather modest declines of 0.02
percent and 0.03 percent in January and February 2015 and still
remained at 0.1 percent (not significantly lower than the 0.15 per-
cent at which they ended 2014). However, interest rates on time
deposit accounts with at least CHF 100,000 fell sharply into nega-
tive territory in January 2015 (rates on three-month deposits fell
from 0.02 percent in December 2014 to −0.11 percent in Janu-
ary 2015 and −0.13 percent in February 2015),12 suggesting that
it may have been the decisions of individuals holding these accounts
that was responsible for the big jump in the elasticity of currency
demand.
In the euro zone, while the coefficient on interest rates has had
the correct sign in the whole post-crisis period since July 2009, the
11One issue affecting the U.K. result may be the fact that there have been very
few changes in official interest rates in the post-crisis period.
12There were similar declines for 1-month, 6-month, and 12-month time
deposits.
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coefficient has typically not been statistically significant when begin-
ning with a 24-month window and extending forward the end date
by one month. However, the coefficient has had the correct sign
(with a very significant increase in magnitude) and has been statis-
tically significant (primarily at the 5 percent level of significance)
for the whole time since official interest rates became zero in July
2012, with the adjusted R2 in this period ranging from 23 percent
to 51 percent. Indeed, the coefficient on interest rates became con-
sistently statistically significant in December 2011 (when looking
over the whole period to 2016:M1), which coincided with back-to-
back reductions of 25 basis points in official interest rates, from
0.75 percent in October 2011 to just 0.25 percent in December
2011.
In Australia, the relationship between deposit rates and currency
changes appears to have strengthened since late 2012 as the rate-
cutting cycle has progressed further, with the average coefficient on
interest rates of −0.0965, almost double the sample period as a whole
(with the coefficients statistically significant). In Sweden, the coeffi-
cient on interest rates has taken on the correct sign in the post-crisis
period, and the coefficient has increased significantly as interest rates
have declined further and moved into negative territory. However,
the coefficient has not been statistically significant.
Overall, the data tend to show a fairly clear negative relation-
ship in most of the countries under our analysis between changes in
interest rates and currency in circulation, although Sweden appears
to be a key outlier. The negative relationship appears to have
become more prominent in the post-crisis period, particularly as
interest rates have moved yet lower and reached the zero bound.
Indeed, the magnitude of the elasticities has typically risen since
countries reached the zero lower bound (and approached it in
Australia’s case), markedly so in some instances. As yet, interest
rates on household deposits have not typically moved into neg-
ative territory, so it is a little difficult to gauge whether there
would be a large nonlinear change if that were to occur across
the board at commercial banks. The big jump in the interest
elasticity in Switzerland in February 2015, as interest rates on
accounts aimed at higher-net-worth individuals moved sharply into
negative territory, provides some tentative evidence that it could
happen.
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5. Grey Economy/Black Economy
An important determinant of the upward trend in currency usage
in recent decades in most advanced economies is, therefore, the con-
tinuing decline in nominal interest rates. But neither our estimates
of the relevant interest elasticities in section 4 nor those of others
who have studied this subject would suggest that it can explain all,
or even most, of that increase, particularly at a time when the con-
tinued shift to more advanced payments techniques, e.g., over the
Internet/mobile phones, has continued and should be pushing down
further on currency in circulation and the currency-to-GDP ratio.
Moreover, the short-term panic blip in the C/D ratio at the end of
2008 (see section 3) soon subsided.13
So, there must be something else as well. The most likely answer
is a continuing rise in the use of anonymous currency to hide transac-
tions from prying eyes, e.g., of police and tax collectors. This is given
further credence by the fact that most of the rise in currency usage
is represented by high-denomination notes (see section 2), rather
than the lower-denomination notes which are more generally used
in regular transactions and are made available in ATMs.
Rogoff (2016) provides very interesting anecdotal evidence in
support of his view of a fast-growing shadow economy (both the
black and grey economies) over recent years, but doesn’t provide
much empirical or quantitative evidence. The black economy is
defined as consisting of illegal activities, e.g., organized crime, drug
trafficking, while the grey economy is defined as otherwise legal
activities that are deliberately not recorded in order to avoid or
evade taxation. Official national crime data actually reveal large falls
in crime in the United States, the euro area, the United Kingdom,
and Japan over recent decades (see figure 11). This would appear
to suggest that the black economy may have been contracting over
recent years or, certainly at a minimum, it may not have been grow-
ing sharply with a consequent rise in cash usage. Admittedly, there is
significant uncertainty, and traditional surveys of crime may struggle
13Admittedly, the panic-driven surge into cash was extremely large in several
smaller economies at the epicenter of the financial crisis—e.g., Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, and Spain—with gains in currency in circulation of between one-fifth
and one-third between September 2008 and March 2009 alone.
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Figure 11. International Crime Statistics (normalized in
Z-scores)
Sources: Ashworth and Goodhart, U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uni-
form Crime Reports, prepared by the U.S. National Archive of Criminal Justice
Data, Crime Survey for England and Wales, U.K. Office for National Statistics
(ONS), Eurostat, National Police Agency of Japan.
Note: For comparability purposes we have normalized the data for the four coun-
tries by subtracting from each reading its mean and dividing by the standard
deviation.
to keep up with the rapid growth in new areas, e.g., cyber crime,
which has been rising.14 Further research is needed in this area. In
general, it is our belief, without wanting to take a particularly strong
stand on the directionality of the black economy, that the main dri-
ver of growth in the shadow economy over recent years has been the
grey economy, amid depressed demand for labor from traditional
firms in the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis, rising tax rates
as governments tried to repair their damaged finances, and the con-
tinued rise in less traditional forms of working, e.g., self-employment,
zero-hours contracts, part-time work, etc.
The currency demand approach (see in particular Schneider and
Buehn 2013, especially section 3.2.4) has historically been one of
14It is possible that fears that bank accounts, or access to them, could be
hacked might increase demand for currency.
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the main methods for estimating the size of the “shadow economy”
(grey plus black economy). The basic idea is that, since tax evasion
is illegal, almost all grey (and black) economy transactions will be
made in cash (Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are now also being
used, particularly in the black economy), although not all transac-
tions in the shadow economy are paid in cash (Isachsen and Strom
1985 used the survey method to find out that in Norway, in 1980,
roughly 80 percent of all transactions in the hidden sector were paid
in cash).
For obvious reasons, cash is almost always anonymous, whereas
most other payment mechanisms leave a record. What one then can
do is to estimate how much of the change in currency in circulation
or the currency-to-GDP ratio is due to incomes/consumption, inter-
est rates, technological trends, and such other variables as theory
or direct observation suggest (a standard currency demand regres-
sion). One can then either take the residuals from such an equation
as an estimate of the shifting shape of the hidden economy or, bet-
ter, add additional variables that should be correlated with the grey
economy, such as tax rates—especially value-added tax (VAT) and
various excise taxes—and the ratio of the self-employed and unem-
ployed to the total workforce. For a critique of such an approach,
and a literature survey, see Kirchga¨ssner (2016), though we do not
share his enthusiasm for the survey method, which we consider to
be unwarranted.15 Also see the earlier paper by Caridi and Passerini
(2001).
Earlier, the currency demand approach had been one of the most
commonly used approaches, first used by Cagan (1958) and extended
by Tanzi (1980, 1983), and later employed by one of us (Drehmann
and Goodhart 2000, and Drehmann, Goodhart, and Krueger 2002).
More recently, however, it has fallen out of favor. Perhaps the main
reason for this has been the scale of the international use of the
U.S. dollar, and more recently of the euro, both for transactions
and for savings purposes. This makes it hard to disentangle in those
15In this the subjects of the survey “were first asked whether they have car-
ried out activities in the black economy during the last 12 months. Those who
affirmed that they have were asked how many hours per week they spent on these
activities. They were also asked for their average wage per hour.” Somehow, we
are skeptical that this approach will get full and truthful answers.
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instances domestic from international determinants of the demand
for currency. See Fischer, Kohler, and Seitz (2004), however, for
an ingenious method to try to distinguish between the demands
for currency caused by (i) transactions needs, (ii) domestic hoard-
ing, and (iii) foreign usages. For other similar methods, see Rogoff
(2016).
The issues discussed above with estimating the drivers of cur-
rency usage are not, however, such a problem in the case of the
United Kingdom, as sterling notes are not unduly held, or usable,
abroad. Moreover, black (illegal) transactions are largely under-
taken in high-denomination notes (such as €500 or CHF 1,000),
and the highest U.K.-denomination note (£50) is of commend-
ably low value. The £50 note was introduced on March 20, 1981
and is a very low-denomination note compared with those avail-
able in the euro and Swiss franc (at current exchange rates, a £50
note would buy about €58 and CHF 63). Meanwhile, there is lit-
tle evidence to suggest that the size of the black economy in the
United Kingdom has been increasing over recent years, with crime
falling over recent decades (see figure 11). The number of recorded
offenses in England and Wales has declined by around two-thirds
since the peak in 1995 and has continued to decline since the finan-
cial crisis despite the deep and extended recession in the United
Kingdom.
In contrast, we believe that the grey economy has been expand-
ing quite rapidly over recent years in the United Kingdom. Why
do we think that? Of course, we cannot be sure, because the grey
economy’s rationale is largely to evade tax, especially VAT, national
insurance contributions (NICs), pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) and excise
duties, and hence goes unreported. The easiest way to avoid records
of taxable transactions is to mediate these via cash payments. In the
last two or three decades, such tax rates have been rising sharply (see
figure 12), with the rate of VAT increasing from 15 percent at the
beginning of the 1990s to 20 percent at present and cigarette taxes
increasing significantly above the rate of inflation during this time.
The latter changes fueled a surge in cross-border smuggling of cig-
arettes from the European continent where comparable taxes were
dramatically lower. According to the Tobacco Manufacturers’ Asso-
ciation, by 1999 non-U.K. duty paid cigarettes represented around
one-quarter of the market from just 3 percent at the beginning of
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Figure 12. Indirect Taxes Have Risen Sharply in the
United Kingdom over Recent Decades
Sources: Ashworth and Goodhart, Bank of England, ONS.
the decade.16 Also, see The Economist (1999) for a brief summary
of the surge in cross-channel smuggling of alcohol and tobacco into
the United Kingdom.
Meanwhile, there is a general belief, which we share, that the self-
employed find it easier to operate in the grey economy than those in
employment. Some individuals may prefer to be in self-employment
partly because of the subsequent ease of avoiding, or evading, tax
on incomes and/or consumption.17 Pissarides and Weber (1989) esti-
mated that in the United Kingdom actual self-employment income
is 1.55 times as much as reported self-employment income. Based on
this they estimated that the grey economy was 5.5 percent of GDP
(although they referred to the grey economy as the black economy).
Cabral, Kotsogiannis, and Myles (2015) find that income reported
by the self-employed in the United Kingdom must be multiplied by
a factor of 1.24 to obtain their true income. Using data from ran-
dom tax audits by Her Majesty’s Revenues & Customs (HMRC),
the independent Institute for Fiscal Studies (2017) found that
16See http://the-tma.org.uk/tma-publications-research/facts-figures/uk-cigarette-
consumption. Admittedly, the increase would not solely reflect increased com-
mercial smuggling; some of the rise was also likely due to increased cross-border
shopping and duty-free sales.
17Amromin and Chakravorti (2009, pp. 324–5) share this view.
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Figure 13. U.K. Self-Employment
Sources: Ashworth and Goodhart, ONS.
59 percent of those reporting self-employment income were noncom-
pliant (noncompliance includes both mistakes and deliberate under-
reporting), with those in the construction, transport, and hospitality
sectors having the highest levels of noncompliance.
U.K. self-employment has grown very strongly over the past
decade (see figure 13), particularly so in the post-crisis period
(around one-third of all jobs created in the post-crisis period have
been in self-employment) amid weaker demand for employees from
traditional firms. Self-employment gains have been significantly
greater than in other developed countries; see Goodhart and Ash-
worth (2014). This would seem to be consistent with a fast-growing
grey economy and, indeed, the government appears to have become
increasingly concerned about the threat from rising tax evasion.
HMRC has launched numerous campaigns encouraging workers in
sectors known for tax evasion—e.g., self-employed, building trades,
Internet traders, rental property landlords, etc.—to voluntarily dis-
close untaxed income in exchange for reduced penalties. This also
included a “Second Incomes Campaign” targeting employees of firms
who pay taxes through the traditional channel for their main job
but do undeclared self-employed work on the side. Meanwhile, in
the 2015 Autumn Statement the government launched a call for
evidence to better understand the links between “cash, tax evasion
and the hidden economy” (see HMRC 2015), and in the Budget of
2018 launched a call for evidence on “cash and digital payments
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in the new economy.”18 Moreover, the Taylor Review of Modern
Working Practices (Taylor 2017), commissioned by the Prime Min-
ister, recommended that the “government should consider accred-
iting a range of platforms designed to support the move towards
more cashless transactions with a view to increasing transparency
of payments, supporting individuals to pay the right tax.” This was
related to those who hire casual self-employed workers—for example,
gardeners, window cleaners, child minders, etc.
We attempted to find some metrics that could serve as proxies
for a shift of expenditures out of the recorded economy into the grey
economy. We think that we may possibly have found three such met-
rics. The first is the ratio of self-employment to total employment,
the second is the rate of VAT, and the third is the estimated pro-
portion of U.K. cigarette consumption that was not subject to U.K.
duties.19 We used a vector error-correction model, somewhat simi-
lar to Cusbert and Rohling (2013) for Australia and Miller (2017)
for the United Kingdom.20 Our variables for seeking to explain the
recent rise in currency holdings in the United Kingdom are as follows
18In the latter, the government noted that £50 notes are believed to be rarely
used for routine purchases and are instead held as a “store of value” and that
there is also a general perception that they are used for money laundering, hidden
economy activity, and tax evasion. Whilst acknowledging that the value of the
£50 note is low compared with other countries’ highest-denomination notes, the
government noted that in an attempt to tackle the hidden economy and illegit-
imate use of cash, some countries have removed their highest-value notes from
circulation. This encouraged media speculation that the government is consider-
ing getting rid of £50 notes; see Barrett and Cook (2018). The government also
noted that several countries have introduced limits on cash transactions.
19Much of this is bought abroad but intended for private resale in the United
Kingdom. It is also possible that this variable is a proxy for a more widespread
willingness to purposefully evade British indirect taxation.
20The VECM model in Miller (2017) was estimated over two periods: 1993:Q4–
2008:Q2 and 1993:Q4–2015:Q4. The model included eight explanatory variables
including consumption, bank rate, number of link ATMs per person, number of
bank branches per person, self-employment, unemployment rate, exchange rate,
and the number of regular payments made per person in cash. In the full-period
model from 1993:Q4–2015:Q4 which included dummy variables for the financial
crisis and the millennium, all variables in the model were statistically significant,
except for the number of regular payments made in cash. Of the variables we
shared in common, the coefficients on interest rates were almost identical, whilst
the coefficients on consumption and self-employment were broadly similar. The
adjusted R2 was slightly higher in Miller (2017), at 0.36.
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(data are quarterly from 1992:Q4 to 2014:Q4 with forecasts made to
the present date).
These are in log form:
• household consumption;
• interest rate;
• self-employment as a proportion of total employment;
• VAT rate;
• the estimated proportion of U.K. cigarette consumption that
has not paid U.K. duty;
• two dummies, one for Y2K and the other for the 2008–09 spike
due to the financial crisis.
The resulting regression (see equation (2)), passes the Johansen test
of cointegration, and all the variables have the correct signs and are
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The magnitude of the
coefficient on consumption is close to unity as expected, and interest
rates have a small negative sign. A 1 percent rise in the proportion
of self-employed in total employment leads to a rise in currency in
circulation of almost 0.7 percent; a 1 percent rise in the rate of
VAT leads to a 0.4 percent rise in currency in circulation, whilst
a 1 percent rise in the proportion of U.K. cigarette consumption
that is non-U.K. duty paid is expected to lead to a rise of almost
0.1 percent in currency in circulation. The only dynamic variable
that was statistically significant was the lagged change in currency
in circulation, which we have included below.
The speed-of-adjustment coefficient has the correct negative sign
and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level and suggests that
more than 4 percent of the long-term disequilibrium from the steady-
state level of currency in circulation is corrected every quarter. The
adjusted R2 was 0.31, and the Durbin-Watson statistic of around
1.8 suggests little evidence of residual autocorrelation.
Admittedly, some caution should be exhibited. We experienced a
certain amount of parameter instability in various regressions we ran,
some variables we thought a priori would be significant were not, and
our out-of-sample forecasts have not been particularly accurate to
date (see figure 14). That said, the impact of the United Kingdom’s
EU referendum appears to have been an important factor driving
currency movements in our out-of-sample period. The year-on-year
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Figure 14. Actual versus Model-Fitted U.K. Quarterly
Changes in Currency in Circulation
Sources: Ashworth and Goodhart, Bank of England, ONS, Tobacco Manufac-
turers’ Association.
Note: For the regression we assumed that the proportion of U.K. cigarette
consumption that was non-U.K. duty paid remained stable after 2014.
percentage change in currency in circulation accelerated ahead of
the June 23, 2016 referendum and then surged further to peak at 9
percent year-on-year in September (which was greater than its peak
in the Great Financial Crisis) amid fears about the possibility of
a major financial and banking shock. However, the economic and
financial impact of the vote quickly subsided and the year-on-year
pace of currency increase slowed sharply and actually went negative
in March 2018 for the first time in decades.
d(Currency in Circulation) (dependent)
Constant 0.012 (6.8)
Household consumption 1.121 (19.1)
Interest rate −0.025 (−3.0)
Self-employment/employment 0.633 (2.7)
VAT rate 0.372 (4.4)
Cigarette consumption non-U.K. duty 0.057 (2.2)
d(Currency in Circulation(t−1)) 0.210 (2.1)
Speed of adjustment −0.042 (−2.9)
Adjusted R-squared = 0.31
Standard error = 0.005
DW statistic = 1.83 (2)
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The effect of the grey economy variables appears to be reason-
ably large in explaining the rise in currency in circulation over time.
In the decade between 1992:Q4 (when the currency-to-GDP ratio
appeared to reach a trough) and 2002:Q4, the increase in non-U.K.
duty paid cigarette consumption appears to account for around a
third of the increase in the currency in circulation, although there
was very likely some lagged impact from the rise in the VAT rate to
17.5 percent in 1991:Q2. Since end-2007, when the currency in cir-
culation began to accelerate sharply, the self-employment and VAT
variables account for around one-fifth of the rise in the currency in
circulation.
Conducting equivalent econometric exercises for other countries—
e.g., U.S. dollar, euro, and Swiss franc—is complicated by the wide-
spread use of their notes abroad, which precludes the use of the
currency demand approach. Analysis of the euro area is further com-
plicated by the large number of countries in the bloc and the vastly
contrasting economic performances in the post-financial-crisis era. In
the future, we aim to publish a paper examining the likely increase
in the size of the grey economy in the United States. In addition,
in a forthcoming paper we will conclude that an important driver
behind the sharp fall in currency in circulation in Sweden over recent
decades has been a reduction in the size of the grey economy.
6. Conclusions
Under the influence of technological improvements in payment
technologies (paper checks, plastic debit/credit cards, and, later
on, electronic digital payments), currency usage underwent a long,
continuous trend decline in the decades following World War II.
What is perhaps quite surprising is that this decline ended, and
then reversed, in a number of developed countries, starting in the
late 1980s/early 1990s; see sections 1 and 2. Moreover, since the
aftermath of the GFC there has been a very significant rise in the
currency-to-GDP ratio in most countries, with Sweden being the
major outlier.
The currency-to-deposit ratio in the United States surged in
1929–33 as the public feared whether their banks were safe. There
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was a similar upward blip in the C/D ratio in several major devel-
oped countries in 2008:Q4, after the failure of Lehman Brothers, but
it was short-lived and reversed quickly; see section 3.
Instead, we document two main reasons for the recent rise in
currency-to-GDP ratios. The first, discussed in section 4, is the sharp
decline in nominal interest rates on alternative asset holdings, par-
ticularly on deposits. We reconfirm earlier findings of a significant
(negative) interest elasticity of demand. Our examination of whether
such elasticity increased (nonlinearly) as interest rates, e.g., on bank
deposits, approached zero was somewhat inconclusive. There are
some signs of this happening in the countries under our analysis,
but it is too soon to be sure.
Nevertheless, the estimated effect of falling interest rates on cur-
rency demand has not been large enough to account for all of the
considerable rise in the currency-to-GDP ratios in recent years. So
in section 5 we turn to study whether this can be explained by its
use as an anonymous means of payment in the shadow economy
(black and grey economies). With crime rates falling sharply over
recent decades in most major developed countries, however, we are
somewhat doubtful the black economy has been growing particularly
strongly, if at all.
We use a currency demand approach to test whether grey econ-
omy variables could help explain the rise in currency in circulation
in the United Kingdom. This approach had been commonly applied
in earlier studies but has fallen out of favor in some large part
because the major currencies—the U.S. dollar and the euro—were
so widely held abroad. But sterling is not subject to much foreign
holding. Currencies where there are high-value denominations—e.g.,
the Swiss franc, euro, and dollar ($100 bill)—will also be used for
black economy purposes (e.g., drugs, terror, people smuggling), but
this is less likely with sterling, where the top denomination (£50) is
commendably small; and the black economy has probably not grown
much in the United Kingdom in recent years anyway. We establish
that the currency in circulation reacts significantly to grey economy
proxies, self-employment as a proportion of total employment, VAT
rates, and cigarette consumption that evades tax. Hence, our work
supports the view that the grey economy has likely been growing
in the United Kingdom, particularly in the aftermath of the Great
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Financial Crisis amid weaker labor demand from traditional firms,
growth in less traditional forms of employment, and rising indirect
taxes.
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